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Abstract
Following a large-scale deregulation of the financial sector during the 1980s and the
subsequent massive credit expansion, a banking crisis in Finland caused a sharp
contraction in the economy in the early 1990s. One of the key policy responses to the crisis
was the creation of an asset management company called Arsenal in 1992. The original
purpose of Arsenal was to absorb, manage, and liquidate the bad assets of the Savings Bank
of Finland (an entity created by the government-forced merger of 41 of the country’s 81
savings banks). During the following years, Arsenal expanded to become a group of
multiple asset management companies dealing with the bad assets of other failed entities.
The Arsenal Group, as the group later came to be known, was ultimately responsible for
managing more than FIM 40 billion (approx. $8.1 billion) in assets. By 1999 more than 90%
of the assets had been wound down. Arsenal was not placed in liquidation until 2003, at
which time losses had reached nearly FIM 20 billion. In the most recent available financial
statements, Arsenal reported that it was down to one employee with just a handful of
assets outstanding in domestic and foreign bankruptcy court that were expected to be
finalized within three years, at which point Arsenal would be dissolved.
Keywords: asset management company, Arsenal, Finland, Government Guarantee Fund,
Nordic banking crisis, Savings Bank of Finland , broad-based asset management

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based asset management company programs.
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Finland: Arsenal
At a Glance
Following a large-scale deregulation
of the financial sector during the
1980s and the subsequent massive
credit expansion, a banking crisis in
Finland caused a sharp contraction in
the economy in the early 1990s. One
of the key policy responses to the
crisis was the creation of an asset
management company called Arsenal
in 1992. The original purpose of
Arsenal was to absorb, manage, and
liquidate the bad assets of the Savings
Bank of Finland (an entity created by
the government-forced merger of 41
of the country’s 81 savings banks).
Arsenal was wholly government
owned, with the Government of
Finland owning 74% of the shares
and an off-state-balance-sheet fund
holding the remainder, and received
an unconditional guarantee of up to
23 billion Finnish markkas (FIM)
($4.7 billion) for bonds issued by
Arsenal itself.3 Arsenal acquired the
assets of the Savings Bank of Finland
at their original book value, which
was significantly greater than their
market value at the time, using the
Arsenal bonds guaranteed by the
Finnish government (Arsenal 1994).

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: “The Arsenal Group manages, develops and
liquidates assets for which it has assumed responsibility, in
order to ensure optimal financial results under prevailing
circumstances. Its objective is to minimize any further
Government investments in the Group and to reduce the
risk of loss on investments already made” (Arsenal 1995).
Launch dates
Wind-down dates

Size and type of NPL
problem
Program size
Eligible institutions

Usage
Outcomes
Ownership structure
Notable features

Circa end of 1993
1999: more than 90% of
assets disposed;
2003: Arsenal placed in
liquidation;
2018: one employee remains to
manage
few
remaining
bankruptcies
18.7% at the end of 1993
(Klingebiel 2000);
Savings bank loans
Not specified at outset
Initially just the Savings Bank of
Finland; later expanded to
include other institutions
Closed-bank only
FIM 40 billion
Loss of FIM 20 billion on
FIM 40 billion in assets
Public-owned
Allowed the banks who bought
the good assets to give them
back to Arsenal if they became
non-performing in the first
year; allowed Arsenal to
prioritize the pursuit of bad
debtors
over
strict
loss
minimization

During the following years, Arsenal expanded to become a group of multiple asset
management companies dealing with the bad assets of other failed entities. The Arsenal
Group was ultimately responsible for managing more than FIM 40 billion in assets. By 1999
more than 90% of the assets had been wound down. Arsenal was not placed in liquidation
FIM 4.936 = 1 USD during the time period in question (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Foreign Exchange
Rates Archive).
3
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until 2003, at which time losses had reached nearly FIM 20 billion. In the most recent
available financial statements (2017), Arsenal reported that it was down to one employee
with just a handful of assets outstanding in domestic and foreign bankruptcy court that
were expected to be finalized within three years, at which point Arsenal would be
dissolved.
Summary Evaluation
The consensus of a number of academic reviews of the Nordic area crisis and specific
analyses of Arsenal concludes that Arsenal was provided with the appropriate level of
funding and professional management necessary and that it operated transparently.
Arsenal accepted all non-performing loans from the Savings Bank of Finland (similar
portfolios and no-questions-asked acceptance of non-performing loans were present in the
other asset management companies that subsequently were joined into the Arsenal Group).
This feature made it challenging to wind down the portfolio and has contributed to the
protracted existence of Arsenal, despite an initial five-to-seven-year expected life span.
Arsenal is generally seen as having greatly contributed to the banking sector’s eventual
recovery.
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Finland – Arsenal: Finland Context
GDP
$89.2 billion in 1993
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)
$103.3 billion in 1994
GDP per capita
$17,609 in 1993
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)
$20,301 in 1994
Data for 1993:
Moody’s: n/a
S&P: AAA
Fitch: n/a
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt)
Data for 1994:
Moody’s: n/a
S&P: AAA
Fitch: n/a
Data not available for
Size of banking system
1993
Data not available for
1994
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP
84.51% in 1993
73.08% in 1994
Data not available for
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial
1993
system
Data not available for
1994
Data not available for
5-bank concentration of banking system
1993
Data not available for
1994
Data not available for
1993
Foreign involvement in banking system
Data not available for
1994
Data not available for
1993
Government ownership of banking system
Data not available for
1994
Yes in 1993
Existence of deposit insurance
Yes in 1994
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank
Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Overview

Background
The Buildup
During the 1980s in Finland there was a large-scale deregulation of the financial sector as
outlined in Figure 1. The government allowed banks to lend into areas where they had not
lent before and therefore lacked market-specific knowledge. Regulatory decisions were
subject to court challenges, and it has been theorized that this “raised the threshold for
introducing stricter supervisory practices” (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). In addition,
regulators lifted strict limits on deposit and interest rates. More broadly, the supervisory
authorities were viewed as relatively weak: “they lacked resources and qualified staff and
did not prioritise on-site inspections” (Moe, Solheim, and Vale 2004). The savings banks
were taking extraordinary risks and were under-capitalized.
Figure 1: Timeline of market liberalization in Finland

Source: Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994.
During the same time period, both household and corporate debt increased significantly.
The Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish “tax systems encouraged borrowing through very
generous rules for deducting interest expenses from taxable income” (Moe, Solheim, and
Vale 2004). Household debt rose from 25% of GDP in 1980 to 45% in 1992, and corporate
debt rose from 70% of GDP to nearly 90% of GDP in just a couple of years starting in 1989.
Housing prices doubled between 1986 and 1989, and the Finnish stock market tripled in
value between 1985 and 1988 (Mayes, Halme, and Liuksila 2001). Commercial property
prices may have increased even more than residential prices. This led to the traditional
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cycle where the increases in property prices lead to higher collateral values, which
facilitate an increase in bank lending (Moe, Solheim, and Vale 2004).
In addition, there were two significant international events that affected the Finnish
economy in the late ’80s and early ’90s. First, Finland faced significant speculative attacks
on its currency, which resulted in a major devaluation in September 1992. In an attempt to
stabilize its currency, the Finnish government tightened monetary policy through rising
interest rates, which dampened borrowing (Mayes, Halme, and Liuksila 2001).
Second, Finnish exports collapsed with the fall of the Soviet Union (Moe, Solheim, and Vale
2004). The Soviet Union had accounted for approximately 15% of Finnish exports (Mayes,
Halme, and Liuksila 2001). The decrease in exports to the former Soviet Union caused a
negative demand shock of approximately 2.5% of GDP to the Finnish economy (Nyberg and
Vihriälä 1994).
The Crisis
Finland was not alone in suffering a banking crisis and economic downturn during the
early 1990s. Sweden, Norway, and Denmark experienced crises that, although they had
distinct causes and effects, were similar in many ways. However, Finland suffered the most,
with a growth rate of negative 8% of GDP during the worst of the crisis years and a peak
unemployment rate at greater than 20% (Mayes, Halme, and Liuksila 2001). See Figure 2.
Figure 2: GDP growth and unemployment rate in Finland in the 1980s and 1990s
GDP growth (%)

Unemployment (%)

Source: Mayes, Halme, and Liuksila 2001.
Outstanding loans to the public by all Finnish deposit banks had more than doubled from
FIM 214 billion to FIM 491 billion from 1985 to 1990 (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994).
Throughout the time period, GDP was growing at a similar pace, so this lending
represented a consistent 75% of GDP (World Bank n.d.). Then, from 1991 to 1995, bank
lending fell by more than a third. It would take nine years before bank lending returned to
the pre-crisis levels (Moe, Solheim, and Vale 2004). This dramatic buildup and then crash of
the banking sector can be seen in the two charts in Figure 3, which show the decrease of
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employment in banking by more than half and, similarly, the closure of more than half of
physical bank branches. By 1993, nearly one in five loans were non-performing (Klingebiel
2000).
Figure 3: Size of banking sector by employment and branches in the 1990s
Banking employees per 1,000 people

Bank branches per 1,000 people

Source: Mayes, Halme, and Liuksila 2001.
Summary of Finnish Government Actions Leading up to Arsenal
Skopbank was one of the banks that most embodied the increase in volume and expansion
into new sectors of lending during the late-1980s boom years. It was a commercial bank
that served as a central bank or correspondent bank to Finland’s savings banks. Skopbank
was one of the first institutions to face imminent collapse as the market began to sour. In
addition to being one of the most aggressive lenders during the “boom years,” Skopbank
made a large, strategic investment in a multiproduct industrial group that fell sharply with
the turn in the market (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). Skopbank was controlled and mostly
owned by the savings banks (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010).
In 1989 the Bank of Finland, Finland’s central bank, and Finland’s Banking Supervision
Office, an arm of the Ministry of Finance, began a “special and increasingly strict
surveillance” of Skopbank’s books (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). In October 1990 a
restructuring program was designed by the authorities that required that the savings
banks raise FIM 1.8 billion in capital from private investors for Skopbank. Ultimately,
however, the capital proved insufficient, and after an acute liquidity crisis in September
1991, the Bank of Finland took majority control of Skopbank, with 53% of the outstanding
shares (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010); recapitalized the bank with an initial investment
of FIM 4 billion in equity; and set up three companies to manage most of the bank’s assets.
This takeover and equity injection were seen as outside the traditional roles of a central
bank (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994).
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In March 1992 the Finnish government provided an FIM 8 billion capital injection program
to the banking system. Participation in the program was voluntary, but “virtually all banks
applied and received a share” (Moe, Solheim, and Vale 2004). The capital was available to
“all banks regardless of their solvency and in relation to their risk-weighted assets.” By
December 1992, FIM 7.9 billion of the FIM 8 billion program had been deployed (Nyberg
and Vihriälä 1994).
In late April 1992, the Parliament created the off-state-balance-sheet Government
Guarantee Fund (GGF) (Parliament of Finland 1992) to prevent a collapse in domestic and
international confidence in the stability of the banking system and its claims. The GGF was
initially provided with FIM 20 billion in federal funds to use to meet that stated goal.
However, by the end of the year, three quarters of the money had been spent. In early 1993,
another FIM 20 billion was made available (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). One of the first
actions of the GGF was to acquire Skopbank from the Bank of Finland.
Another significant action taken by the GGF was the June 1992 decision to force the merger
of 41 of the country’s 81 savings banks into a new entity called the Savings Bank of Finland,
or SBF. SBF accounted for 23.9% of the total financial system’s assets (Klingebiel 2000).
The GGF provided the new entity with an initial commitment of FIM 7.2 billion, including
FIM 5.5 billion in Tier 1 capital and a guarantee for a FIM 1.7 billion subordinated loan. This
original amount proved insufficient, and multiple rounds of further assistance were
required. By October 1993 SBF had received a total of FIM 14.5 billion. At that point, the
GGF sold the healthy parts of SBF, about FIM 41 billion in assets (Nyberg and Vihriälä
1994), to four competing banks: Kansallis-Osake-Pankki, Union Bank of Finland Ltd,
Postipankki Ltd, and the Okobank Group (Bank of Finland 1993).
Program Description
Financing and Governance of Arsenal
On November 18, 1993, after FIM 41 billion in healthy assets of the Savings Bank of Finland
were sold to four large commercial banks, an asset management company called Arsenal
was formed to handle the remaining FIM 30 billion in unhealthy assets (Nyberg and
Vihriälä 1994). The new venture was funded by the Government of Finland (Government)
and the GGF (see Figure 4). In the initial FIM 5 billion capitalization, the Government took a
74% equity stake and the GGF took 26% (Arsenal 1994). Due to higher than originally
anticipated losses, the Government made a series of further capital injections: FIM 6 billion
in 1994, FIM 8 billion in 1995, and FIM 4 billion in 1996 (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010).
The equity balance ultimately shifted slightly to 79% and 21% for the Government and the
GGF, respectively (Klingebiel 2000). See Figure 4 for a visual representation of Arsenal’s
financing.
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Figure 4: Financing of Arsenal

GGF

Government

21%
Equity
Stake

FIM
17.1b*

79%
Equity
Stake

FIM
5.7b*

Investors

$$$

Bonds with
Government’s
unconditional
guarantee

Arsenal

*Sum of five installments between 1993 and 1997.

Sources: Klingebiel 2000; Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010.
Coupled with the FIM 23 billion in total state-injected capital, Arsenal also received an
unconditional guarantee from the Government of up to FIM 28 billion for all “repayment of
bonds and other debt financing issued by Arsenal” (Arsenal 1994). The bonds were
described as “negotiable, State-guaranteed zero-coupon bonds in the form of a book-entry
security and technically comparable to certificates of deposit issued by commercial banks
and governments” (Arsenal 1995). Most of the debt had short tenures. However, in 1996,
two long-term bonds, worth a total of FIM 3 billion, were issued (Arsenal 1996). In its first
series of public debt issuances, Arsenal sold FIM 20.6 billion (Arsenal 1994). The amount of
debt issued is outlined in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Arsenal’s issuance of public debt

Sources: Arsenal 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000.
The governing structure of Arsenal was designed with a balance of private-sector expertise
and Government oversight. Of the six members of the board of directors, two were from the
private sector and four represented the Government. The CEO and other senior
management members were appointed by the Government from the private sector.
Oversight of Arsenal was conducted by the GGF, the State Audit Office, and the
Parliamentary State Auditors (Klingebiel 2000).
Operations and Assets
Arsenal became operational on January 15, 1994 (NAOF 2015) and began the process of
assuming responsibility for the assets the following month. At the outset, the Government
estimated the time horizon within which Arsenal would be able to divest its assets was five
to seven years. However, it was noted that, “the divestment process will possibly continue
after year 2000 if it will assist in reducing the financial burden levied on the Government”
(Arsenal 1994).
The non-performing assets acquired by Arsenal were taken at book value. Given the market
turmoil, it was widely accepted that the book value was substantially higher than the
market value. This was confirmed in the summer of 1994 when an extensive review was
conducted by external surveyors to assess the market value of the complete real estate
portfolio. Based on the estimates, property write-downs amounted to FIM 3.5 billion
during 1994 (Arsenal 1994). The portfolio included loan receivables, real estate, and other
assets totaling a book value of FIM 30 billion (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). This included
15,000 properties and 1,478 companies, of which 95% were real estate companies
(Arsenal 1995).
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Assets originally transferred accounted for 5.2% of Finland’s total banking assets and 8.2%
of GDP (Klingebiel 2000). In addition to the original assets, Arsenal was permitted by law to
extend additional credit as needed, “in cases where this reduces the total cost to the
Government” (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). Also, the four banks that had acquired the
healthy assets of SBF were permitted to transfer to Arsenal any of those assets that
underperformed or became non-performing until the beginning of 1995. Those banks
transferred an additional FIM 10 billion during 1994, bringing the total assets of Arsenal up
to FIM 40 billion (Bank of Finland 1994; Arsenal 1994).
Arsenal’s largest asset disposal of 1995 was the sale of a travel resort, and in 1996 it was a
golf course (Arsenal 1995; Arsenal 1996). Although Arsenal did not commence any new
construction projects, it did manage unfinished property developments if it was
determined that, “the overall result is better than through selling the unfinished project”
(Arsenal 1994).
Outcomes
Expansion to Asset Management Group
Arsenal began as an asset management company with the sole purpose of managing and
liquidating the non-performing loans and other assets of the SBF. However, during the
years following its creation, Arsenal’s purpose was expanded to absorb more troubled
institutions and assets.
In the summer of 1993, the GGF split STS Bank, a small, struggling commercial bank, into
two entities. The entity with healthy assets was bought by KOP Bank, a larger bank. The
entity with bad assets was renamed Siltapankki, and although officially owned by KOP
Bank, control of Siltapankki was held by the GGF. In November 1995 Siltapankki was sold
to Arsenal for only FIM 1 (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010).
In June 1995, the law was changed to allow Arsenal to expand to hold other asset
management companies. When Arsenal was originally founded, there were certain assets of
SBF that had not been transferred to Arsenal itself, but rather had been kept as a subsidiary
bank of Arsenal. In November 1995 the banking charters of this entity (named Arsenal–
SSP) and Siltapankki (renamed Arsenal–Silta) were revoked, and both entities became
asset management companies (Arsenal 1995).
The Bank of Finland (the central bank) took over Skopbank, the correspondent bank of
savings banks, in September 1991. It divided the assets into three holding companies, one
of which was a real estate asset management company called Sponda (Bank of Finland
1991). In May 1996, with real estate assets worth FIM 1 billion, it was sold to Arsenal
(Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012, 694).45

4

The other two holding companies were named Scopulus (which held the shares of Skopbank itself) and
Solidium (which held industrial assets) (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994). Scopulus sold its shares to the GGF in
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Wind-Down and Liquidation
In 1996, the number of debtors being managed by Arsenal Group peaked at 1,584 (Arsenal
1996). At its height, as seen in Figure 6, Arsenal had a total of 630 employees in 1995
(Arsenal 2002). By 2003 there were just 13 salaried employees (NAOF 2015).6 In 1997 the
number of offices was reduced from 22 to 15 (Arsenal 1997) and then from 15 to 6 in 1999
(Arsenal 1999). See Figure 6 for a representation of these changes.
Figure 6: Number of Arsenal employees

Source: Arsenal 2002.
As seen in Figure 7, more than 90% of the peak total assets had been offloaded by 1999
(NAOF 2015).

June 1992. Solidium was merged into Sponda before Sponda was sold to Arsenal (Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012,
675).
5 Note that on page 1 of the Arsenal 1997 Annual Report, the entity is called SKOP-Real Estate.
6 The company also had two liquidators.
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Figure 7: Total assets held by Arsenal (millions of euros)

Source: NAOF 2015.
Arsenal was placed in liquidation in October of 2003. The duties of the board of directors
and managing director were transferred to two liquidators who oversaw a reduction of
outstanding debtors from more than 1,500 to less than 500 between 2003 and 2014 (NAOF
2015). According to Arsenal’s 2017 Financial Statements, the most recent available at the
time of this writing, the liquidation of Arsenal was ongoing, but it was estimated that by the
end of 2018 there would be only one employee. There were a number of Arsenal assets that
were going through domestic or foreign bankruptcies. These were expected to close within
two to three years, at which point Arsenal was expected to dissolve (Arsenal 2017).
As seen in Figure 8, Arsenal lost nearly FIM 20 billion in the first five years of operation
(Arsenal 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998). During the next four years leading up to the
liquidation, Arsenal turned a small annual profit (Arsenal 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002). At the
time of liquidation the cumulative losses stood at FIM 19.07 billion.
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Figure 8: Arsenal’s yearly and cumulative losses

Sources: Arsenal 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002.
The approximately FIM 114 billion cost of the rescue of Finland’s financial system has been
estimated at 17.2% of GDP by 1995. Of this 17.2%, studies have estimated that more than
half of the Government’s investments were recovered, making for an estimated net cost of
about 7% of GDP (Mayes, Halme, and Liuksila 2001). The funding for Arsenal itself was
estimated at 6.6% of GDP (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010).

II.
1.

Key Design Decisions
Part of a package: As part of the Government’s resolution of the Savings Bank of
Finland, Arsenal was created to take over the bad assets.

The asset management company Arsenal was announced in the Fall of 1993 and became
operational on January 15, 1994, after multiple steps had been taken by the Finnish
Government and the Bank of Finland to handle the banking crisis.7 Skopbank, a
correspondent bank for savings banks, had been taken over by the Bank of Finland. Then
41 of the nation’s 81 savings banks were forced to merge into a new entity called the
Savings Bank of Finland. After parts of the healthy pieces of the Savings Bank of Finland
were sold to four larger banks, Arsenal was created to absorb, manage, and liquidate the
non-performing assets.

7

Varying sources report different establishment dates in October and November 1993.
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Legal authority: New authority was sought, and granted under the Government
Guarantee Act of 1992, to create the asset management company Arsenal.

As the financial crisis began to unfold, the government sought new legal authority to,
among other actions, establish an asset management company. This authority was granted
in the Government Guarantee Act of 1992 (Parliament of Finland 1992). In June 1995 a
significant amendment was made to the original act to allow Arsenal to hold other asset
management companies (Arsenal 1995). This was necessary to accommodate the
acquisition of other, smaller asset management companies that had been created during
the crisis to handle the bad assets of other financial institutions.
3.

Special powers: Arsenal did not possess any notable special powers.

Arsenal did not have any special powers of note to pursue its mandate.
4.

Mandate: Arsenal’s two guiding principles were minimizing losses incurred by
the government and investigating irregularities in debtors’ activities.

According to the first annual report of Arsenal, its assignment was to “manage and
liquidate, in an orderly manner and at a minimum cost to the Finnish society and its
taxpayers, the assets and lending activities, of which the responsibility was assumed from
the former Savings Bank of Finland” (Arsenal 1994). Throughout Arsenal’s lifetime, it
managed bad loans and sold real estate and other assets (NAOF 2015).
Arsenal’s other guiding principle was the so-called clarifying objective, alternatively
translated as an “interest in investigation” of nonpaying debtors.8 Parliament’s view was
that this objective would serve “the citizens’ sense of justice.” Under this objective, Arsenal
could allow for a review of debtor irregularities to take priority over the minimization of
taxpayer losses. In the pursuit of this objective, Arsenal initiated long-term trial and debt
collection processes against some debtors, rather than quickly liquidating and winding
them down in the fastest manner possible (NAOF 2015).
5.

Communication: The Government of Finland made a series of increasingly strong
public statements and commitments regarding their handling of the banking
crisis.

The Government of Finland made a number of public statements and commitments
regarding their plan to contain the banking crisis. In March 1992 a special working group
formed by the Prime Minister to review the situation published a report encouraging,
See the English translation from Finnish: https://www.vtv.fi/julkaisut/omaisuudenhoitoyhtio-arsenal-oynselvitystilan-kaytannot/. The National Audit Office of Finland cited the Parliamentary Finance Committee’s
definition of this objective: “The bank subsidies should be subjected to more public scrutiny and all
economically significant credit losses should be thoroughly investigated in connection with the granting of
the bank subsidies, and the granting of the subsidies should be made conditional on investigating the credit
losses. Investigated cases involving suspected crimes and offences should be brought before a court, which
would make them open to public scrutiny. In special audits, opinions should also be expressed on the
irregularities in which liability for damages and criminal liability has expired” (NAOF 2015).
8
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among other actions, the creation of the Government Guarantee Fund. In August 1992 the
Government announced that it would secure the Finnish banking system under all
circumstances (Nyberg and Vihriälä 1994).
In January 1993 the Government made this final commitment more explicit via a
Parliamentary Resolution. The resolution stated, “Parliament requires the state to
guarantee that Finnish banks are able to meet their commitments on time under all
circumstances. Whenever necessary, Parliament shall grant sufficient appropriations and
powers to be used by the Government for meeting such commitments” (Nyberg and
Vihriälä 1994).
6.

Ownership structure: Arsenal was a government-owned asset management
company. While originally a limited joint stock company operated by the
Government, Arsenal became a public enterprise in 1998.

At creation, the Government of Finland owned 74% of the share capital of Arsenal, while
the Government Guarantee Fund held the remaining shares (Arsenal 1994). Originally
structured as a limited joint stock company governed by the Government of Finland,
Arsenal converted to a limited public company in 1998 (Arsenal 1997).
7.

Governance/administration: The board of directors of Arsenal was a mix of
public and private representatives, overseen by multiple government agencies.

The board of directors of Arsenal was made up of four members from the government
sector (the Director General of the State Treasury, the Deputy Head of the Budget
Department in the Ministry of Finance, the Director of the Government Guarantee Fund
Board, and the Industrial Counsellor of the Ministry of Trade and Industry) and two
members from the private sector (Senior Vice President of KOP Bank and CFO of
Huhtamaki Oy, a food and beverage packaging company). The management team was
brought from the private sector (the President and CEO came from a Senior Executive Vice
President role at Partek Corporation, a building materials company). Operations were
overseen by a number of Government agencies, including: the Government Guarantee
Fund, the National Audit Office, and Parliamentary State Auditors (Klingebiel 2000).
Arsenal was required to publish monthly public reports and a full annual report with
audited financial statements. The company created a website that contained interim
reports and key figures on the company’s capital and shareholders (Klingebiel 2000).
In its 1994 Annual Report, Arsenal indicated that it had built an extensive new data system
to manage the growing number of clients, asset portfolios, and internal employees (Arsenal
1994).
8.

Size: The Finnish government did not define the size of Arsenal at the outset.

At its peak at the end of 1994, Arsenal had assets worth FIM 40 billion (Bank of Finland
1994). Although Arsenal acquired additional assets and asset management companies
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during the following years, they were disposing of more assets than they were acquiring
and thus never surpassed the peak size that was reached in the first year (see Arsenal’s
annual reports for the full financial statements).
9.

Funding source: Arsenal was funded by the Finnish government.

Primary funding for Arsenal came from the Government Guarantee Fund and the
Government of Finland. The combined equity capital investments included a total of nearly
FIM 23 billion: FIM 5 billion in 1993, FIM 6 billion in 1994, FIM 8 billion in 1995, and FIM 4
billion in 1996 (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010). The initial investments allocated 74%
ownership to the Government and 26% to the GGF (Arsenal 1994). After the subsequent
rounds of additional capital injections, the Government’s ownership stake increased
slightly to 79% and the GGF’s ownership decreased to 21% (Klingebiel 2000). GGF’s stake
in Arsenal was paid for with KOP Bank shares (Arsenal 1994).
In addition, Arsenal issued mostly short-term, government-guaranteed debt securities on
the market. In 1996 two long-term bonds, worth a total of FIM 3 billion, were issued with
the same government guarantee (Arsenal 1996).
The Government of Finland said in May 1994 that it would guarantee Arsenal’s funding up
to FIM 28 billion for all “repayment of bonds and other debt financing issued by Arsenal”
(Arsenal 1994). In December 1996 the guarantee was reduced by FIM 10 billion to FIM 18
billion (Arsenal 1996). In 1997 it was reduced an additional FIM 3 billion to FIM 15 billion
(Arsenal 1997). In 1998 it was reduced FIM 6 billion to FIM 9 billion (Arsenal 1998). In
1999 it was reduced to just FIM 1 billion (Arsenal 1999). In Figure 9, the red line shows the
Government guarantee and the blue bars show the actual amount of debt issued.

280

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 3 Iss. 2

Figure 9: Arsenal’s Unconditional guarantees and debt issuances

Sources: Arsenal 1994; 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2000.
10. Eligible institutions: Initially, Arsenal took on assets only from the Savings Bank
of Finland. Over time, additional assets were acquired from a handful of other
banks and asset management companies.
Arsenal was founded with the purpose of taking on the bad assets of the Savings Bank of
Finland (SBF), itself created through the forced merger of 41 of the country’s 81 savings
banks (Arsenal 1994). Over time Arsenal accepted assets from other institutions and even
transformed into a group with its holdings of other asset management companies. In March
1995 Siltapankki, an asset management company handling the non-performing assets of
STS–Bank was acquired by Arsenal (Arsenal 1995). Also, real estate assets worth FIM 1
billion were transferred from Skopbank in May 1996 (Kuusterä and Tarkka 2012, 694;
Arsenal 1997). See Figure 10 for an organization chart of Arsenal.
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Figure 10: Arsenal organization chart

Arsenal Group

Arsenal SSP

Arsenal Silta

Skop Real Estate

Source: Arsenal 1997.
Beyond the four institutions that took the healthy assets of SBF, there was no period in
which Arsenal accepted non-performing assets from the broader banking or any other
sector.
11. Eligible assets: Arsenal accepted all non-performing assets of the Savings Bank of
Finland.
Arsenal took on all non-performing assets of the Savings Bank of Finland. According to a
report by the World Bank, the asset portfolio of Arsenal broke down as follows: Real estate
33.7%; client receivables 41%; and other assets 25.3% (Klingebiel 2000; Arsenal 1996).
The four institutions that acquired the healthy assets of SBF were permitted to return any
of those assets that became non-performing during the first year of operation (Bank of
Finland 1994).
12. Acquisition mechanics: After acquiring the entirety of the non-performing assets
from the Savings Bank of Finland, Arsenal obtained further assets on a case-bycase basis.
During the following years, when additional assets and/or asset management companies
were acquired, acquisitions were done in single transactions and not during a specified,
open purchase window.
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13. Acquisition pricing: The assets acquired by Arsenal were priced at their original
book value, an amount significantly higher than the market value of the time.
Arsenal acquired the non-performing assets of the Savings Bank of Finland at their original
book values. The book values were significantly higher than the market value of the time
(Arsenal 1994).
14. Disposal: Arsenal prioritized achieving the best return for its portfolio over the
prompt disposal of assets.
In the summer of 1994, shortly after the initial asset acquisition, Arsenal hired outside
surveyors to conduct a valuation of the entire real estate portfolio (Arsenal 1994). This
valuation was conducted to assist in the disposal of the assets and did not affect the
acquisition price.
15. Timeframe: Arsenal did not have a target end date, with the first annual report
estimating a five-to-seven-year lifespan.
When Arsenal was created, it was not given a target end date or sunset clause. The first
annual report estimated that activities would last between five to seven years, with a plan
to divest by the end of 2000; however, it was noted that “the divestment process will
possibly continue after year 2000 if it will assist in reducing the financial burden levied on
the Government” (Arsenal 1994).
More than 90% of the assets had been sold or written off by 1999. In 2003 Arsenal was
placed in liquidation (NAOF 2015). In 2017 Arsenal was down to a single employee
managing a handful of final bankruptcies that were expected to be finalized within three
years (Arsenal 2017).
The National Audit Office of Finland wrote in 2015 that the pursuit of debtors under
Arsenal’s clarifying objective mandate was “one of the main reasons why Arsenal has
remained operational for considerably longer than was anticipated at the establishment of
the company” (NAOF 2015).

III. Evaluation
A review of the banking crises in the Nordic countries during the early 1990s concluded
that, “creditors’ confidence in the banking systems was quickly restored, banks returned to
profitability fairly quickly, and the impact on the economies of the banking problems
seemed fairly modest.” The authors of the review also made positive conclusions regarding
the amount of transparency in the creation and management of the asset management
companies (Moe, Solheim, and Vale 2004).
A similar cross-country examination of asset management companies by the World Bank
emphasized that, “Arsenal was provided with appropriate funding, had professional
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management, and a skilled human resource base” (Klingebiel 2000). However, because
Arsenal had accepted all non-performing loans regardless of asset type or size, the winddown strategy was slowed because they had to hire a large number of professional staff to
value, manage, and sell the assets. Also, due to the nature of the wide range of real estate
and other assets under management, Arsenal wasn’t able to use “wholesale divestiture
techniques.” A favorable factor, the World Bank noted, was that “appropriate funding
allowed Arsenal to market assets to market value after their transfer” (Klingebiel 2000).
A 2015 audit of the liquidation of Arsenal was commissioned by the Finnish government.
One of their conclusions was that due to the built-in unknown of how long it would take an
asset management company to divest itself of its holdings, “public receivership should also
be considered as an alternative.” Additionally, as a result of the so-called clarifying
objective, Arsenal committed to long-term trial and debt collection processes rather than
simply liquidating quickly, which led to Arsenal’s lifespan lasting much longer than
expected (NAOF 2015).
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